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A Deep Dive into Private Governance
of Deep-Sea Mining
ABSTRACT
Modern, information-driven economies need rare-earth metals
for everything from laptop computers to cellular phones. Society will
require more of these metals for the solar panels, wind turbines, and
storage batteries necessary to convert electricity systems to renewable
energy. The deep sea contains large amounts of high-quality, rare-earth
metals that companies and nations are increasingly interested in
mining. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is authorized under
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to
permit and regulate deep-sea mining of the seafloor outside of national
jurisdiction (the “Area”), and the ISA is currently developing regulations
to issue the first contract allowing deep-sea mining. Deep-sea ecosystems
are, however, understudied, and their functioning, diversity, sensitivity,
and value are poorly understood. As a result, the initial ISA
regulations—intended to protect deep-sea ecosystems—may not
effectively address all environmental harms associated with mining in
these environments. This Note proposes that private environmental
governance mechanisms, like supply chain contracts and credit
agreements, can fill regulatory gaps as they emerge or extend regulations
into national waters if deep-sea mining commences. Private
environmental governance only requires agreement between contracting
parties as opposed to the approval of a large, potentially contentious,
regulatory body like the ISA. Thus, private contractual requirements can
quickly fill gaps in or extend the ISA regulatory regime as new
information on the environmental impacts of deep-sea mining emerges.
If corporations in the retail, technology, or automobile industry recognize
the importance of sustainable rare-earth metal production and
consumption, they can contract to either find alternative, recycled
sources for their technology or minimize the impact of their operations
on the deep sea.
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
recommends limiting global warming to only 1.5°C above
pre-industrial temperatures.1 At current greenhouse gas emissions, the
IPCC predicts global temperatures will reach this threshold within the
next ten to thirty years unless drastic preventive action is taken.2
Renewable energy grids and electrified transportation, heating, and
cooling systems have the potential to rapidly transition global
1.
Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5ºC
Approved by Governments, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c-approved-by-governments/ [https://perma.cc/NR3G-PMHF].
2.
Jeff Tollefson, IPCC Says Limiting Global Warming to 1.5ºC Will Require Drastic Action, 562 NATURE 172, 172–73 (2018).
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economies away from fossil fuels and lower greenhouse gas emissions.3
The solar panels, windmills, and electric cars needed to transition
society away from coal or natural gas power plants and internal
combustion engines will require large amounts of rare-earth metals.4
These metals—cobalt, molybdenum, and platinum, for example—are
essential for photovoltaic cells to capture sunlight, for magnets within
wind turbines, and for batteries capable of storing large amounts of
energy for the days without sun or wind.5 As a result, demand for these
minerals is currently soaring.6
China dominates rare-earth metal mining and has historically
mined and processed more than 95 percent of all rare-earth metals
globally.7 After China withheld supplies from Japan in 2017 in response
to escalating diplomatic relations between the two countries, other
countries and multinational corporations developed an interest in
finding alternative sources of rare-earth metals.8 Brazil, Malaysia,
Australia, and parts of Greenland are all potential new sources.9
Significant environmental problems are, however, associated with
rare-earth metal mining and processing.10 Open-pit mines disrupt the
surface of local ecosystems and pollute surrounding areas.11 Rare-earth
metal deposits on land are also often bound in a matrix with other
minerals, so mining operations must process the matrix after mining to

3.
Id.; see David Roberts, The Global Transition to Clean Energy, Explained in 12 Charts,
VOX, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/6/18/18681591/renewable-energy-chinasolar-pv-jobs [https://perma.cc/7NQF-43HF] (June 26, 2019, 9:42 AM); Michael P. Vandenbergh &
Jonathan M. Gilligan, Forks in the Road, 31 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 163,
167–71 (2020).
4.
See Nicola Jones, A Scarcity of Rare Metals Is Hindering Green
Technologies, YALE ENV’T 360 (Nov. 18, 2013), https://e360.yale.edu/features/a_scarcity_of_rare_metals_is_hindering_green_technologies [https://perma.cc/NEG6-9B6Q]; Critical
Mineral Commodities in Renewable Energy, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (June 4, 2019),
https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/critical-mineral-commodities-renewable-energy#Solar%20Panels [https://perma.cc/UUB5-FCYX].
5.
See Jones, supra note 4.
6.
See id.
7.
Mike Ives, Boom in Mining Rare Earths Poses Mounting Toxic
Risks, YALE ENV’T 360 (Jan. 28, 2013), https://e360.yale.edu/features/boom_in_mining_rare_earths_poses_mounting_toxic_risks [https://perma.cc/AJU5-3E8K].
8.
Id.
9.
See id.
10.
Mass. Inst. of Tech., Environmental Damage, MISSION 2016: THE FUTURE OF
STRATEGIC NATURAL RESOURCES, https://web.mit.edu/12.000/www/m2016/finalwebsite/problems/environment.html [https://perma.cc/9PRJ-4Q5E] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
11.
Id.

598

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:3:595

isolate the rare-earth metals from other minerals.12 This processing can
generate large amounts of toxic byproducts that mining companies
must properly treat and store.13 As a result, many nations and
companies are in search of alternative sources of abundant or higher
quality rare-earth metals in attempts to generate competition in the
metals market and lower the environmental costs of mining.14
The deep seafloor is likely the world’s largest untapped source of
high-quality rare-earth metals and may be a crucial source for the
continued development and proliferation of renewable technologies.15
Exploratory surveys suggest high-quality rare-earth metals are
plentiful in at least three distinct habitats on the deep seafloor.16 To
mine these deposits, however, mining companies must develop
technology that can operate at extreme depths in the most remote
environments on the planet.17
Because so little is known about deep-sea ecosystems, the
environmental consequences of deep-sea mining are difficult to
predict.18 Due to the challenges of studying remote and inhospitable
environments—and the depths at which these ecosystems exist—the
composition, diversity, and functions of deep-sea ecosystems are poorly
understood relative to terrestrial and shallow-water ecosystems.19

12.
See Michael Standaert, China Wrestles with the Toxic Aftermath of Rare Earth
Mining, YALE ENV’T 360 (July 2, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/china-wrestles-with-thetoxic-aftermath-of-rare-earth-mining [https://perma.cc/9TWM-HSTG].
13.
See id.
14.
See Nils Zimmermann, Your 2030 Electric Vehicle Is Parked on the Bottom of the
Ocean, DEUTSCHE WELLE (May 28, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/your-2030-electric-vehicle-isparked-on-the-bottom-of-the-ocean/a-53530969 [https://perma.cc/Y5FA-P86S].
15.
See id.
16.
See Kathryn A. Miller, Kirsten F. Thompson, Paul Johnston & David Santillo, An
Overview of Seabed Mining Including the Current State of Development, Environmental Impacts,
and Knowledge Gaps, FRONTIERS MARINE SCI., Jan. 2018, at 1, 2; Charles Roche, Industrial Mining in the Deep Sea: Social and Environmental Considerations, MIN. POL’Y INST. (May 14, 2015),
http://www.mpi.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/May-2015-Duke-Uni-Webinar-Mining-thesea-MPI-web-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CVZ-WP2Z].
17.
See Kate Baggaley, These Fearsome Robots Will Bring Mining to the Deep Ocean, NBC
NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/innovation/these-fearsome-robots-will-bring-mining-deepocean-n724901 [https://perma.cc/P2GM-D3ED] (Feb. 27, 2017, 9:01 AM).
18.
See Miller et al., supra note 16, at 2, 12.
19.
See Wil S. Hylton, History’s Largest Mining Operation Is About to
Begin, ATLANTIC, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/01/20000-feet-under-thesea/603040/ [https://perma.cc/N9QQ-2NUX ](last visited Jan. 25, 2022); How Much of the Ocean
Have We Explored?, NAT’L OCEAN SERV., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/exploration.html
[https://perma.cc/KHF8-ZLNR] (Feb. 26, 2021); Holly J. Niner, Jeff A. Ardron, Elva G. Escobar,
Matthew Gianni, Aline Jaeckel, Daniel O. B. Jones, Lisa A. Levin, Craig R. Smith, Torsten Thiele,
Phillip J. Turner, Cindy L. Van Dover, Les Watling & Kristina M. Gjerde, Deep-Sea
Mining with No Net Loss of Biodiversity–An Impossible Aim, FRONTIERS MARINE SCI., Mar. 2018,
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Without a real understanding of environmental baselines and the
resilience and recovery capacity of the ecosystems on the deep seafloor,
scientists and environmental groups are concerned that
deep-sea mining will have substantial, potentially devasting and
permanent consequences on life in the deep sea.20
This Note details the possible legal mechanisms to limit the
environmental impacts of rare-earth metal mining on deep-sea
ecosystems. Part I provides background information on the metals
needed for the global transition to renewable energy sources, the three
deep seafloor habitats in which those metals are most abundant and of
the highest quality, and the technology needed to mine them. Part II
then introduces and analyzes the private, national, and international
legal regimes that can impose environmental protections on the
collection of rare-earth metals. Finally, Part III proposes that supply
chain contracts, resource agreements, and other forms of private
environmental governance can serve as important extensions and
gap-fillers to emerging international regulations and further mitigate
the environmental consequences of deep-sea mining.

at 1, 2–8 (describing the important ecosystem functions attributed to deep-sea ecosystems
despite the fact that most species within them are unknown or unidentified).
20.
See Eva Ramirez-Llodra, Paul A. Tyler, Maria C. Baker, Odd Aksel Bergstad, Malcolm
R. Clark, Elva Escobar, Lisa A. Levin, Lenaick Menot, Ashley A. Rowden, Craig R. Smith & Cindy
L. Van Dover, Man and the Last Great Wilderness: Human Impact on the Deep Sea, PLOS ONE,
July 2011, at 1, 11–12.

600

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:3:595

I. THE DESIRE FOR AND POTENTIAL LIMITS TO DEEP-SEA MINING
A. Minerals Worth Mining for
Manganese, cobalt, lithium, and copper are rare-earth metals
and
are
essential
components
in
the
battery-powered
technologies, such as cellphones and laptops, that underpin modern,
information-driven economies.21 These same rare-earth metals are also
needed to produce batteries to power electric cars.22 Similarly,
molybdenum, platinum, and tellurium are rare-earth metals that are
key components of thin-film, high-efficiency photovoltaic cells used in
solar panels and magnets needed for other renewable energy sources. 23
Because these green energy technologies also require batteries to store
energy when the sun is not shining, the demand for cobalt, lithium, and
manganese will likely rise even further.24 For example, energy storage
requirements may drive the annual demand for cobalt in 2050 up 450
percent from its 2018 level.25 This “green demand” for rare minerals will
build upon the previous interest and investment in mining precious
minerals for technology and jewelry.26
Due to depleting land deposits, inefficient recycling of existing
products containing these minerals, and the increasing demand for
minerals, interest in mining the deep seafloor is rising.27 Recent
technological developments are making deep-sea mining feasible for the

21.
See Catherine Danley, Diving to New Depths: How Green Energy Markets Can Push
Mining Companies into the Deep Sea, and Why Nations Must Balance Mineral Exploitation with
Marine Conservation, 44 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 248–55 (2019); Bénédicte
Cenki, Critical Minerals Are Vital for Renewable Energy. We Must Learn to Mine Them Responsibly, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 16, 2020, 1:55 PM), https://theconversation.com/critical-mineralsare-vital-for-renewable-energy-we-must-learn-to-mine-them-responsibly-131547
[https://perma.cc/2LA9-N6D9].
22.
See Cenki, supra note 21; Zimmermann, supra note 14; Critical Mineral Commodities
in Renewable Energy, supra note 4.
23.
See Katia Moskvitch, Deep Sea Mining Could Save Humanity from Climate Change
Disaster. But at What Cost?, WIRED, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/deep-sea-mining-about-totake-off [https://perma.cc/SP7B-DCKN] (July 12, 2018).
24.
See Cenki, supra note 21; Critical Mineral Commodities in Renewable Energy, supra
note 4.
25.
KRISTEN HUND, DANIELE LA PORTA, THAO P. FABREGAS, TIM LAING &
JOHN DREXHAGE, WORLD BANK GRP., MINERALS FOR CLIMATE ACTION: THE
MINERAL INTENSITY OF THE CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITION 11 (2020), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/961711588875536384/Minerals-for-Climate-Action-The-Mineral-Intensity-of-the-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf [https://perma.cc/J98D-8CE8].
26.
See Hylton, supra note 19.
27.
Danley, supra note 21, at 251–53.
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first time.28 In addition, the grade of some minerals, such as copper,
cobalt, nickel, and gold, in the deep sea may be substantially higher
than terrestrial sources of the same mineral.29 If high-quality, deep-sea
minerals become more accessible as renewable technology increases
their demand, mining operations will become economically feasible.30
Because these lucrative mineral deposits exist in vulnerable, remote
ecosystems under international waters with historically no governance,
the legal framework that regulates their extraction will be critical to
ensure operations are sustainable.31
B. The Deep Sea
The deep sea and seafloor, all areas below 200 meters of
seawater, are some of the least explored and understood ecosystems
remaining on Earth.32 Because much of the ocean floor is under more
than 3,000 meters of water, human exploration of these areas only
became possible with recent technological advances.33 Even now,
roughly 80 percent of the global ocean is unexplored.34 Little data on
the biodiversity and genetic connectivity of ecosystems in these
environments are available, but the data that do exist suggest that,
contrary to expectations, unique life forms can exist at these depths.35

28.
See Miller et al., supra note 16, at 18; see also Paul A. J. Lusty & Bramley J. Murton,
Deep-Ocean Mineral Deposits: Metal Resources and Windows into Earth Processes, 14 ELEMENTS
301, 304 (2018).
29.
Roche, supra note 16.
30.
See Lusty & Murton, supra note 28, at 304–05 (discussing the many factors that
influence the economic viability of deep-sea mining and suggesting that the practice will be viable
in locations with high-grade minerals and where logistics are not prohibitive).
31.
See Miller et al., supra note 16, 11–12.
32.
See id. at 2.
33.
See id.; L. M. Wedding, S. M. Reiter, C. R. Smith, K. M. Gjerde, J. N. Kittinger, A. M.
Friedlander, S. D. Gaines, M. R. Clark, A. M. Thurnherr, S. M. Hardy & L.B. Crowder, Managing
Mining of the Deep Seabed, 349 SCI. 144, 144 (2015).
34.
How Much of the Ocean Have We Explored?, supra note 19. But see Sarah Emerson,
Why Haven’t We Explored the Ocean like Outer Space?, VICE (June 18, 2016, 2:45 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/pgk3z9/why-havent-we-explored-the-ocean-like-outer-space
[https://perma.cc/B6SZ-N975].
35.
Miller et al., supra note 16; Sabine Gollner, Stefanie Kaiser, Lena Menzel, Daniel O.B.
Jones, Alastair Brown, Nelia C. Mestre, Dick van Oevelen, Lenaick Menot, Ana Colaço,
Miquel Canals, Daphne Cuvelier, Jennifer M. Durden, Andrey Gebruk, Great A. Egho, Matthias
Haeckel, Yann Marcon, Lisa Mevenkamp, Telmo Morato, Christopher K. Pham, Autun Purser,
Anna Sanchez-Vidal, Ann Vanreusel, Annemiek Vink & Pedro Martinez Arbizu, Resilience of
Benthic Deep-Sea Fauna to Mining Activities, 129 MARINE ENV’T RSCH. 76, 78–80 (2017);
Andrew D. Thaler & Diva Amon, 262 Voyages Beneath the Sea: A Global Assessment of Macro- and
Megafaunal Biodiversity and Research Effort at Deep-Sea Hydrothermal Vents, PEERJ, Aug. 6,
2019, at 1, 2–4.
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Despite the total absence of sunlight, limited food supply, and low
metabolic rates from high water pressure and low temperature, diverse
life forms and reproductive strategies have evolved to survive in or near
the ocean floor.36 Hydrothermal vents along geologic boundaries are an
exception to this paradigm—the high temperatures and unique
chemistry that result from the interaction of cold, deep seawater and
volcanic magma create novel and extremely productive ecosystems
thousands of meters beneath the ocean surface.37 Exploration of the
deep sea has not only discovered this life, but also large amounts of
lucrative, rare metals like cobalt, manganese, and copper, which are
increasingly scarce on land.38
Three deep-sea habitats and mineral deposits are most likely to
be mined: (1) polymetallic nodules from the abyssal plain, (2) the crust
of submerged seamounts or mountains that do not reach the ocean
surface, and (3) massive seafloor sulfide deposits often associated with
hydrothermal vents.39 Each of these habitats hosts different biological
species and provides unique ecosystem services which may be put at
distinct risk if mined.40
Polymetallic nodules, which form on areas of the seafloor in
water that hovers around 4°C, were last at the surface of the ocean
hundreds of years ago and contain higher levels of nutrients and lower
levels of oxygen than surface waters.41 The nodules accumulate over
thousands, if not millions, of years, are rich in nickel, cobalt, copper,
and manganese, and may even contain platinum and tellurium.42
Submerged seamounts rise up from the seafloor like underwater
mountains and often generate upwelling zones of deep, nutrient-rich
waters that feed algae blooms at the surface, and thus connect
deep-water and surface-water ecosystems.43 This connection can
36.
See PETER HERRING, THE BIOLOGY OF THE DEEP OCEAN 50–70, 237–38 (M.J.
Crawley, C. Little, T.R.E. Southwood & S. Ulfstrand eds., 2002) (describing the various life forms
and life-history strategies that deep-sea organisms evolved to survive in deep-sea sediment and
water); Gollner et al., supra note 35, at 78–79 (noting the long lives and slow-growing nature of
organisms on seamounts); Wedding et al., supra note 33.
37.
See Gollner et al., supra note 35, at 78 (describing the high biomass but specialized
and endemic nature of the mega- and macrofauna that are dependent on the in situ primary
production of chemosynthesizers that utilize active hydrothermal vents); Thaler & Amon, supra
note 35, at 1–2.
38.
See Thaler & Amon, supra note 35, at 2–3.
39.
Lusty & Murton, supra note 28, at 302–03; Miller et al., supra note 16, at 2–6.
40.
Miller et al., supra note 16, at 2–4.
41.
See Gollner et al., supra note 35, at 78.
42.
Moskvitch, supra note 23; Miller et al., supra note 16, at 2, 3, 10.
43.
See Miller et al., supra note 16, at 4; Telmo Morato, Simon D. Hoyle, Valerie Allain &
Simon J. Nicol, Seamounts Are Hotspots of Pelagic Biodiversity in the Open Ocean, 107 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 9707, 9709 (2010). But see Ashley A. Rowden, Thomas A. Schlacher, Alan
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promote diverse and abundant life important for fisheries and provide
sustenance for animals like whales and turtles.44 These seamounts
often consist of cobalt-rich manganese crusts and may contain other
rare metals such as vanadium, molybdenum, platinum, and tellurium.45
Hydrothermal vents and other areas where geothermal energy
interacts with seawater are unique ecosystems that occur along either
geologically active or previously active ocean ridges.46 Water adjacent
to or within the seafloor in geologically active areas can reach
temperatures as high as 400°C, even at depths of 1,000 to 4,000
meters.47 This high-temperature seawater that is in contact with
extreme geothermal temperatures becomes more buoyant and rises.48
As the water rises, it accumulates high concentrations of sulfur and
other metals on the seafloor.49 If this seawater reaches the surface of
the ocean floor, metal sulfides may rapidly precipitate and form
“chimneys” or vents, but if the metal-rich waters never reach the
seafloor, they may still precipitate just beneath the ocean floor.50 These
sulfur-rich metal deposits are referred to as “seafloor massive sulfide”
deposits.51 The high temperatures, high sulfur concentrations, and
vent-structure habitats have resulted in discrete and entirely novel
biological communities of worms, crabs, and mussels in and around
hydrothermal vents.52 Exploratory mining has indicated that these
vents and other deposits also contain lucrative mineral deposits rich in
iron, copper, lead, zinc, gold, molybdenum, platinum, and silver.53
Williams, Malcolm R. Clark, Robert Stewart, Franziska Althaus, David A. Bowden, Mireille
Consalvey, Wayne Robinson & Joanne Dowdney, A Test of the Seamount Oasis Hypothesis:
Seamounts Support Higher Epibenthic Megafaunal Biomass than Adjacent Slopes, 31 MARINE
ECOLOGY 95, 101, 103–04 (finding significantly higher epibenthic megafaunal biomass associated
with seamounts than on adjacent continental slopes, but arguing that biomass on seamounts in
less productive regions must also be evaluated and compared to other pelagic habitats).
44.
Miller et al., supra note 16, at 4.
45.
Id. at 3; Moskvitch, supra note 23.
46.
Miller et al., supra note 16, at 3.
47.
Id.
48.
R.E. Boschen, A.A. Rowden, M.R. Clark & J.P.A. Gardner, Mining of Deep-Sea
Seafloor Massive Sulfides: A Review of the Deposits, Their Benthic Communities, Impacts from
Mining, Regulatory Frameworks and Management Strategies, 84 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 54, 55
(2013).
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 55–56.
51.
Id. at 54.
52.
See Thaler & Amon, supra note 35, at 2; C. L. Van Dover, J. A. Ardron, E. Escobar, M.
Gianni, K. M. Gjerde, A. Jaeckel, D. O. B. Jones, L. A. Levin, H. J. Niner, L. Pendleton, C. R.
Smith, T. Thiele, P. J. Turner, L. Watling & P. P. E. Weaver, Correspondence, Biodiversity Loss
from Deep-Sea Mining, 10 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 464, 464 (2017).
53.
See Boschen et al., supra note 48, at 56; Moskvitch, supra note 23; Miller et al., supra
note 16, at 3–4.
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All three mineral sources on the deep seafloor present different
technological challenges to, and unique potential ecological impacts
from, mining operations.54 All three are, however, rich, untapped
sources of trace metals that are increasingly valuable in global
economies that simultaneously rely more on computer and information
technology and are transitioning from fossil fuel to renewable energy
sources.55
C. The Emergence of Mining Technology
Despite long-term interest in searching the seafloor for
minerals, no large-scale, commercial deep-sea mining has yet occurred
in areas beyond national jurisdiction.56 Operating in remote, deep,
perpetually dark, frigid, and high-pressure environments is incredibly
challenging.57 In addition, each type of mineral deposit demands
machinery and methods uniquely tailored to extract the specific
resource the environment contains.58 Remotely operated nodule
harvesters need to vacuum or scrape polymetallic nodules off the ocean
floor and send them up thousands of meters to vessels on the surface.59
The surface support vessels must then isolate desirable minerals and
transfer them to additional support vessels that transport the resources
to shore.60 Similarly, remotely operated machines must cut active and
inactive hydrothermal vents and transport the vent to the surface in an
enclosed riser system intact or grind them into a slurry that is then
pumped to the surface for further processing.61
The steep and rugged cobalt-rich crusts of submerged seamounts
may pose the most serious technological challenge for remote,
autonomous mining vehicles.62 The slope, grade, and ruggedness of a
54.
See Lisa A. Levin, Kathryn Mengerink, Kristina M. Gjerde, Ashley A. Rowden,
Cindy Lee Van Dover, Malcolm R. Clark, Eva Ramirez-Llodra, Bronwen Currie, Craig R. Smith,
Kirk N. Sato, Natalya Gallo, Andrew K. Sweetman, Hannah Lily, Claire W. Armstrong & Joseph
Brider, Defining “Serious Harm” to the Marine Environment in the Context of Deep-Seabed Mining,
74 MARINE POL’Y 245, 250–54 (2016).
55.
See HUND ET AL., supra note 25, at 73; Jones, supra note 4.
56.
See Jonathan Watts, Race to the Bottom: The Disastrous, Blindfolded Rush to
Mine the Deep Sea, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/sep/27/race-tothe-bottom-the-disastrous-blindfolded-rush-to-mine-the-deep-sea [https://perma.cc/7XER-3SUA]
(Mar. 17, 2022, 6:59 PM).
57.
See Danley, supra note 21, at 231.
58.
See Lusty & Murton, supra note 28; Baggaley, supra note 17; Miller et al., supra note
16, at 9.
59.
Levin et al., supra note 54, at 250.
60.
Id.
61.
Id. at 251.
62.
Id. at 253.
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specific seamount, as well as the thickness of the crust deposit and its
associated habitats, can vary widely.63 Thus, a collection system on a
submerged seamount must account for complex and rugged
environments.64 Ultimately, like mining nodules and vents, seamount
mining would likely scrape or dig out ore from the crust before crushing
the ore into a slurry and transporting the slurry to the surface in a riser
pipe.65
All three of these techniques may have similar environmental
impacts. Each will generate plumes that disperse sediment and
potentially toxic compounds that have settled in the deep sea over
thousands of years into the water column.66 These sediments could
remain suspended for years and spread far beyond the mining
location.67 Because each mining technique also requires moving mined
materials with water through a riser pipe from the ocean floor to the
surface, operators must discharge water from the riser pipe back into
the ocean either at the surface, somewhere in the water column, or back
close to the seafloor.68 Wherever the return flow of the water from the
riser pipe is discharged, the wastewater will release sediments, metals
that leach into the water during processing, and unnaturally warm
waters in the water column.69 The discharge could impact marine life
at the surface or at depths where communities are adapted to stable
deep ocean waters.70 Furthermore, the large, remotely operated
machines and the numerous pumps needed to move ore up from the
deep sea to the surface support vessels will generate noise, light, and
vibrations that could have unforeseen consequences on marine life of all
shapes, sizes, and behaviors.71

63.
Id. (the prevalence of sometimes abundant sponge and coral communities adds an
additional challenge and impact to mining on seamounts).
64.
See id. (similar challenges may exist at hydrothermal vents but are more likely to
occur and cause problems at seamounts).
65.
Id.
66.
See Miller et al., supra note 16, at 15; see also Enrique Isla, Elisabet
Pérez-Albaladejo & Cinta Porte, Toxic Anthropogenic Signature in Antarctic Continental Shelf and
Deep Sea Sediments, SCI. REPS., June 14, 2018, at 1, 3.
67.
Jeffrey C. Drazen, Craig R. Smith, Kristina M. Gjerde, Steven H. D. Haddock, Glenn
S. Carter, C. Anela Choy, Malcolm R. Clark, Pierre Dutrieux, Erica Goetze, Chris Hauton,
Mariko Hatta, J. Anthony Koslow, Astrid B. Leitner, Aude Pacini, Jessica N. Perelman, Thomas
Peacock, Tracey T. Sutton, Les Watling & Hiroyuki Yamamoto, Midwater Ecosystems Must Be
Considered when Evaluating Environmental Risks of Deep-Sea Mining, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCIS. U.S. 17455, 17455–56 (2020).
68.
Id. at 17456; Miller et al., supra note 16, at 15.
69.
Miller et al., supra note 16, at 15–16.
70.
See id. at 16.
71.
See id.
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Similarly, each mining technique poses unique potential risks to
life on the ocean floor and within the water column.72 The large
machines that mining companies have designed to collect polymetallic
nodules in the upper fifteen to forty centimeters of soft sediments on
the abyssal plain (4,000 to 6,000 meters deep) will compress soft
sediments within which animals burrow, remove rock substrates on
which animals attach, and generate massive sediment plumes that
could suspend and spread sediments into the water column for miles.73
The sediment in this plume will eventually settle and may bury
unmined areas of the abyssal plain in sediment that, absent human
intervention, would take millennia to accumulate.74 Some research
suggests that only a few millimeters of sediment would naturally
accumulate on the abyssal plain every 1,000 years, and that animal
communities living on the ocean floor may take decades or centuries to
recover from less than one centimeter of sediment deposition.75 The
combination of all this activity will introduce disruptions on the ocean
floor that may take centuries or even millennia to fully recover from due
to low temperatures and the low availability of food.76
Mining hydrothermal vents and seamounts pose risks to unique,
endemic habitats. The collection of hydrothermal vents will remove
critical structures for vent-associated species.77 Reformation of active
hydrothermal vents may occur over decadal time scales, but little
information exists that describes the recovery of inactive vents.78 The
removal of cobalt-rich crusts will destroy what can be diverse and
abundant sessile sponge and coral communities that thrive on
seamount slopes.79 Because seamounts can serve as critical connections
between nutrient-rich, deep-sea water and light at the ocean surface,
plankton may bloom around seamounts and support large and diverse
fish communities.80 Therefore, mining on seamount slopes has the
72.
See Miller et al., supra note 16, at 12–14.
73.
Levin et al., supra note 54, at 250; Andrea Koschinsky, Luise Heinrich, Klaus
Boehnke, J Christopher Cohrs, Till Markus, Maor Shani, Pradeep Singh, Karen Smith Stegen &
Welf Werner, Deep-Sea Mining: Interdisciplinary Research on Potential Environmental, Legal,
Economic, and Societal Implications, 14 INTEGRATED ENV’T ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 672, 676–78
(2018).
74.
Levin et al., supra note 54, at 250; Gollner et al., supra note 35, at 82–83.
75.
See Gollner et al., supra note 35, at 82–83; Ramirez-Llodra et al., supra note 20;
Miller et al., supra note 16, at 15.
76.
Koschinsky et al., supra note 73, at 676–77; Levin et al., supra note 54, at 250.
77.
Levin et al., supra note 54, at 251; Gollner et al., supra note 35. See generally Thaler
& Amon, supra note 35.
78.
Levin et al., supra note 54, at 251–52.
79.
Id. at 253; Miller et al., supra note 16, at 4–5.
80.
Levin et al., supra note 54, at 254; Miller et al., supra note 16, at 4–5.
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potential to disrupt both the habitat on the seamount itself and the
planktonic communities that thrive in the limited areas of the open
ocean where deep water is pushed to the surface.81
D. Regulation of the Seafloor
Prior to the twentieth century, the high seas were considered
unclaimed and beyond the jurisdiction of any single nation.82
Technological advancements after World War II, however, made the
living and nonliving resources of the open ocean more accessible.83 The
prospect of deep-sea mining appeared not only more feasible, but also
commercially viable for nations with both the technology and capital to
attempt mining, such as the United States and the Soviet Union.84
Because the development and remote operation of underwater
technologies required significant resources and investment, poorer
nations feared that wealthier nations would rapidly exploit or
assert sovereignty over the lucrative resources of the deep sea
in areas traditionally open to the international community.85
As a result, a coalition of the international community—particularly
countries with limited capital—wanted to establish international legal
frameworks that would regulate the waters and fisheries of the open
ocean and the deep seafloor.86
Sufficient interest emerged in the international community to
convene three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea in
order to establish a legal framework for regulating the oceans.87 After
years of deliberation, negotiation, and several subsequent amendments,
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
emerged in 1982 to clearly define the scope of coastal national
sovereignty and govern the oceans.88 This framework set international
rules and regulations that govern the deep seafloor for the common

81.
Levin et al., supra note 54, at 254.
82.
Randy W. Tong, It’s Time to Get Off the Bench: The U.S. Needs to Ratify the Law of the
Sea Treaty Before It’s Too Late, 48 U. PAC. L. REV. 317, 320–21 (2017).
83.
Id. at 321.
84.
Danley, supra note 21, at 239.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.; Tong, supra note 82, at 321–22.
87.
See Tong, supra note 82, at 321; James D. Brousseau, Frozen in Time: A Fresh Look
at the Law of the Sea and Why the United States Continues to Fight Against It, 42 S. U. L. REV.
143, 150 (2014).
88.
Danley, supra note 21, at 239–40; David Hartley, Guarding the Final Frontier: The
Future Regulations of the International Seabed Authority, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 335, 339
(2012).
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heritage of humankind and the benefit of the broader international
community.89
Within the agreement, nations maintain complete jurisdiction
over the seafloor within their territorial seas that extend twelve
nautical miles from the mean low water line of the shore (the
“baseline”).90 In addition, coastal nations may maintain Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs) within 200 nautical miles of their baseline.91
Inside their EEZ, nations maintain sovereignty over the living and
nonliving natural resources in the water and seabed, as well as the
economic exploration and exploitation of the zone for energy production
from wind or currents.92 Nations may retain jurisdiction over nonliving
resources on their continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles if the
continental margin extends beyond that distance, but are limited to no
more than 350 nautical miles from their baseline or 100 nautical miles
from where the seafloor dips more than 2,500 meters beneath the
surface.93 The convention labels all remaining seafloor outside national
jurisdiction as the “Area.”94
Within the Area, UNCLOS empowers the International Seabed
Authority (ISA) to organize and control activities on the seafloor.95 The
ISA is an autonomous organization consisting of an Assembly, Council,
and Secretariat.96 The major representative body of the ISA is the
Assembly which includes a representative of each nation that ratified
UNCLOS.97 The Assembly elects the Secretariat and the Council and
ultimately approves the rules and regulations that the Council
proposes.98 The Council consists of thirty-six elected members and
develops the ISA’s policies, rules, and regulations that govern
prospecting, exploration, and exploitation in the Area before presenting
them to the Assembly.99 Lastly, the Secretariat conducts the day-to-day
89.
Tong, supra note 82, at 321–22.
90.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 2–3, 5, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
91.
Id. arts. 55–58.
92.
Id. art. 56.
93.
Id. arts. 76–77.
94.
Id. arts. 1, 137.
95.
Id. arts. 156–57.
96.
Id. art. 158.
97.
Id. arts. 156, 159; see The Assembly, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/authority/assembly [https://perma.cc/NW35-KALP] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
98.
UNCLOS, supra note 90, art. 160. The Secretary-General of the ISA heads the
Secretariat. Id. art. 166.
99.
Id.
art.
162.
See
generally
The
Council,
INT’L
SEABED
AUTH.,
https://www.isa.org.jm/authority/council/members [https://perma.cc/LC4N-FVM9] (last visited
Feb. 18, 2022).
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administration of the authority.100 The ISA must regulate the Area for
the benefit of humankind and must therefore equitably share the
financial and economic benefits derived from the Area.101 Each
party-nation to UNCLOS must ensure that agents and nationals
conform to UNCLOS and ISA requirements during all activity within
the Area.102
In 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 72/249,
instituting an annual intergovernmental conference from 2018 through
2020 to discuss a new legally binding instrument within UNCLOS that
will ensure the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.103 The conference was
specifically instructed to address: (1) environmental impact assessment
requirements; (2) area-based management tools, including marine
protected areas; (3) capacity-building and transferring of marine
technology to help developing countries contribute to and benefit from
the agreement; and (4) access to and benefit sharing of marine genetic
resources in the ocean beyond national jurisdiction.104 To date, the
conference has convened for three sessions but has yet to agree on the
implementation of a new agreement or the relationship of a new
agreement with existing governance frameworks.105 The UN General
Assembly voted to indefinitely postpone the fourth conference
scheduled to occur at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic.106 A
new agreement that outlines environmental assessment or area
100.
UNCLOS, supra note 90, art. 166. See generally The Secretariat, INT’L SEABED AUTH.,
https://www.isa.org.jm/index.php/secretariat [https://perma.cc/Z5D4-GLDX] (last visited Feb. 18,
2022).
101.
UNCLOS, supra note 90, arts. 136, 140, 160.
102.
Id. art. 139.
103.
G.A. Res. 72/249 (Dec. 24, 2017); see E.M. De Santo, Á. Ásgeirsdóttir, A.
Barros-Platiau, F. Biermann, J. Dryzek, L.R. Gonçalves, R.E. Kim, E. Mendenhall, R. Mitchell, E.
Nyman, M. Scobie, K. Sun, R. Tiller, D.G. Webster & O. Young, Protection Biodiversity in
Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: An Earth System Governance Perspective, 2 EARTH SYS.
GOVERNANCE 100029, 1–2 (2019) (discussing the process leading to, and potential areas of
concern within, negotiations on an agreement to conserve and sustainably use marine
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction).
104.
De Santo et al., supra note 103; Background, UNITED NATIONS: INT’L
CONF.
ON
MARINE
BIODIVERSITY
OF
AREA
BEYOND
NAT’L
JURISDICTION,
https://www.un.org/bbnj/content/background [https://perma.cc/UBM5-2VKE] (last visited Feb. 18,
2022).
105.
See Efthymios Papastavridis, The Negotiations for a New Implementing Agreement
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Concerning Marine Biodiversity, 69 INT’L &
COMPAR. L.Q. 585, 591–93, 599–603, 607–09 (2020).
106.
G.A. Dec. 74/543, U.N. Doc. A/74/49 (Vol. III), at 163–64 (Mar. 11, 2020) (delaying the
fourth session of the Conference until “the earliest possible available date to be decided by the
[General] Assembly”); G.A. Dec. A/75/570, U.N. Doc. A/75/49 (Vol. III) (June 9, 2021)
(delaying the fourth session until 2022 at the earliest).
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management requirements in the ocean outside national jurisdiction
could impose environmental requirements on deep-sea mining
operations, but substantial uncertainty surrounds whether and what
future agreement may emerge.107
E. Holdouts
As of September 2021, 167 countries have ratified UNCLOS.108
In response to holdouts, the party-nations renegotiated the original
1982 UNCLOS treaty in 1994 to eliminate controversial mandatory
technology transfer provisions, limit mining regulatory authority, and
restrict seabed mining royalties.109 Although these amendments
prompted the United States to sign the treaty in 1994, the Senate failed
to ratify the treaty despite the United States’ heavy involvement in its
development.110 The Senate again declined to ratify the treaty in 2007
after President Bush expressed his support, and once again in 2012
after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony from
the Secretary of State and several military officials, who recommended
Senate ratification.111 The Senate’s arguments against ratifying the
treaty appeared to stem from concerns that US companies may be
subjected to the whims of foreign interests and the international
bureaucracy of the ISA.112 As a result, the United States remains a
significant holdout from UNCLOS and ISA regulations, despite
widespread international support for the agreement.113
II. REGULATING MINING OF THE DEEP SEAFLOOR
A. Regulation Within Territorial Seas and Exclusive Economic Zones
Article 57 of UNCLOS establishes that nations may claim an
EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles from their territorial sea baseline in
which they maintain sovereignty over both the living and nonliving
resources of the seafloor.114 Individual coastal nations thus may
regulate the development of deep-sea mining within this zone.115
107.
See Papastavridis, supra note 105, at 593, 609–10.
108.
About
ISA,
INT’L
SEABED
AUTH.,
[https://perma.cc/7WBR-XC3J] (last visited Dec. 22, 2021).
109.
Tong, supra note 82, at 323–24.
110.
Id. at 324.
111.
Id. at 325.
112.
Id. at 323.
113.
Id. at 326.
114.
UNCLOS, supra note 90, arts. 56–57.
115.
Id. art. 56; Danley, supra note 21, at 240–41.

https://www.isa.org.jm/about-isa
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Namibia, for example, has already extracted 1.4 million carats of
diamonds within its coastal waters.116 Japan authorized zinc mining
within its territorial waters at depths of 1,600 meters in 2017 and
claimed the operation would ultimately yield amounts equivalent to
Japan’s total annual zinc consumption.117 For Japan, a country that is
a net importer of resources, the capacity to mine resources on the
seabed within its territorial waters could transform its access to
mineral resources and shift the nation from a net importing to a net
exporting nation.118 Other nations like South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and
Papa New Guinea are also evaluating mining within their territorial
and EEZ waters.119
In the United States, mining within territorial and EEZ waters
would likely be governed under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA), which extends federal jurisdiction over all submerged lands
on the continental shelf beyond state jurisdictions—approximately
three miles from the coastline—to international waters.120 The
Secretary of the Interior is authorized to lease areas of the outer
continental shelf for mining minerals other than oil, gas, or sulfur
through a competitive bidding process and must follow existing federal
law to minimize the environmental impact of the mining.121
Because only around 46 percent of the global ocean is within 200
nautical miles of a coastline, much of the ocean floor, laden with
potentially lucrative mineral deposits, is outside any nation’s
jurisdiction.122 Even within that 46 percent of the ocean, nations may
have varying interests or abilities to regulate deep-sea mining within

116.
Hylton, supra note 19.
117.
R. Carver, J. Childs, P. Steinberg, L. Mabon, H. Matsuda, R. Squire, B. McLellan &
M. Esteban, A Critical Social Perspective on Deep Sea Mining: Lessons from the Emergent
Industry in Japan, 193 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 105242, 1 (2020).
118.
Id.
119.
Hylton, supra note 19; Danley, supra note 21, at 255.
120.
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1333(a); 30 C.F.R. §§ 581.2,
581.11 (2020); see Non-Energy Marine Minerals Legal Framework, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY
MGMT.,
https://www.boem.gov/marine-minerals/non-energy-marine-minerals-legal-framework
[https://perma.cc/PD4W-Q8L4] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (providing an overview of the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management’s legal authority to lease hard rock mining on the outer continental
shelf); Outer Continental Shelf, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/oil-gasenergy/leasing/outer-continental-shelf [https://perma.cc/E69M-HZRZ] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021)
(providing a succinct definition of the outer continental shelf).
121.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b), 1337(k); see Environmental Oversight, BUREAU
OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/marine-minerals/environmental-oversight
[https://perma.cc/P9N6-FBQF] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (describing how BOEM complies with
federal environmental laws, regulations, and executive orders, and requires monitoring of
impacts after mining activities).
122.
See About ISA, supra note 108.
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their territorial or EEZ waters, especially in areas where nations
dispute boundaries with other nations.123
B. ISA Regulation of the Area
The UNCLOS charges the ISA to regulate the exploration and
exploitation of mineral resources within the Area for all nations under
the agreement.124 Under the treaty, all countries or organizations
sponsored by another country must obtain an “exploration contract”
with the ISA before exploring an area for mining, as well as a separate
“exploitation contract” to commence commercial mining.125 These
contracts require operations to follow ISA regulations and ensure that
the economic benefits of mining accrue to the “benefit of mankind as a
whole.”126 To date, the ISA Assembly has developed exploration
regulations for mineral deposits in all three habitats of interest and
approved thirty exploration contracts.127
In preparation for its first exploitation contracts, the ISA
Assembly is now drafting exploitation regulations that could come into
effect in 2022.128 These regulations and contracts may prohibit mining
within the Area where substantial evidence suggests that mining poses
a risk of “serious harm” to deep-sea environments.129 The regulations
are likely to implement a precautionary approach to mining and aim for
an adaptive management strategy to minimize the potential for harm
and address harms as they emerge.130 Nations that sponsor mining
123.
See Carver et al., supra note 117, at 5 (highlighting the many social factors that drive
the territorial claims of the seabed and interest in deep-sea mining); Clive Schofield,
Securing the Resources of the Deep: Dividing and Governing the Extended Continental Shelf, 33
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 274, 291 (2015) (describing development and problems associated with delineating outer continental shelf boundaries and the potential for overlapping jurisdictional claims).
124.
UNCLOS, supra note 90, Annex III, art. 3.
125.
Exploration
Contracts,
INT’L
SEABED
AUTH.,
https://www.isa.org.jm/index.php/exploration-contracts
[https://perma.cc/H3UU-LJXD]
(last
visited Jan. 12, 2020); The Mining Code, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/index.php/mining-code [https://perma.cc/H92E-3W6M] (last visited Jan. 12, 2020); Michael W. Lodge
& Philomène A. Verlaan, Deep-Sea Mining: International Regulatory Challenges and Responses,
14 ELEMENTS 331, 333 (2018).
126.
UNCLOS, supra note 90, arts. 136, 140, 150; Lodge & Verlaan, supra note 125.
127.
See Exploration Contracts, supra note 125; Koschinsky et al., supra note 73, at 681;
Hylton, supra note 19.
128.
See Draft Exploitation Regulations, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code/ongoing-development-regulations-exploitation-mineral-resources-area
[https://perma.cc/9XH8-386T] (last visited Sept. 5, 2020); Levin et al., supra note 54, at 246;
Hylton, supra note 19.
129.
UNCLOS, supra note 90, arts. 160, 162; see Draft Exploitation Regulations, supra note
128; Levin et al., supra note 54, at 246; Hylton, supra note 19.
130.
See Levin et al., supra note 54, at 246.
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companies are responsible for ensuring an “adequate means” of due
diligence to assist the ISA to control the mining companies’ activities
within the Area and to apply the precautionary principle in proportion
to the environmental risk.131 Once in place, regulations will also provide
minimal environmental regulations for deep-sea mining within the
EEZs of nations that have ratified the agreement.132
In addition, an ongoing intergovernmental conference is
currently negotiating potential amendments to UNCLOS to ensure the
conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond
national jurisdiction.133 The UN General Assembly charged the
intergovernmental conference to develop: (1) frameworks for
environmental impact assessments; (2) area-based management tools
(including tools for marine-protected areas); and (3) the capacity and
transfer of marine technology to help developing countries contribute to
and benefit from UNCLOS.134 If enough nations ratify environmental
impact assessment or area-based management commitments as a
result of the intergovernmental conference, either of these
commitments could also alter deep-sea mining regulatory
requirements.135 To date, the intergovernmental conference has not
reached a consensus or drafted an agreement, and nations would still
need to ratify such agreement before it would have any operational
effect.136 The difficulties associated with building a consensus to adopt
and ratify any proposals from the intergovernmental conference will
likely require negotiators to balance the potential environmental
benefits of the agreement with the associated costs, which could
ultimately limit its effectiveness.137
131.
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with
Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS Rep.
100, 110, 125–35; see UNCLOS, supra note 90, art. 139.
132.
UNCLOS, supra note 90, arts. 208–09 (requiring coastal states to adopt laws or
regulations to: (1) prevent pollution of the marine environment in connection with seabed
activities and for those measures to be no less effective than international rules and standards,
and (2) prevent pollution from vessels flying the flag of their State within the area); Lodge & Verlaan, supra note 125, at 334.
133.
G.A. Res. 72/249, supra note 103, ¶¶ 1–2; De Santo et al., supra note 103, at 1. But see
G.A. Dec. 74/543, supra note 106 (delaying the fourth session of the Intergovernmental
Conference from 2020 until the COVID-19 pandemic will allow the session to be safely
conducted).
134.
G.A. Res. 72/249, supra note 103, ¶ 2.
135.
Background, supra note 104.
136.
See De Santo et al., supra note 103, at 2.
137.
See id.; Glen Wright, Julien Rochette, Kristina M. Gjerde & Lisa A. Levin, Comment,
Protect the Neglected Half of Our Blue Planet, 554 NATURE 163, 164 (noting that previous
agreements had committed to protect marine biodiversity that have not borne out and that political consensus among member nations may trump scientific evidence).
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1. Holdout Nations’ Regulations in the Area
Nations like the United States, who never ratified UNCLOS,
may still develop laws to govern their companies mining in the Area.138
US companies that mine the deep sea in the Area must adhere to the
Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resource Act (DSHMRA).139 Congress
passed DSHMRA in 1980 to temporarily regulate deep-sea mining
pending the United States’ ratification of UNCLOS.140 The
environmental requirements of deep-sea mining within holdout
nations’ laws are entirely at their discretion, and the relationship
between these laws and ISA regulations within the Area is unclear.141
For example, the declaration of purpose in DSHMRA explicitly states
that the “exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral
resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas,” subject
merely to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states
and general principles of international law.142 This purpose is
seemingly in conflict with UNCLOS and the ISA; both emerged to
provide a regulatory framework over the previous, unregulated
freedoms of nations on the high seas.143 As a result, US companies with
claims to mineral rights in the Area face a substantial risk that ISA
contracts could overlap with their claims and jeopardize recognition of
their property rights.144 In addition, because the United States and
other holdout nations have no representatives within the ISA
Assembly, they have limited influence on the development of ISA’s
deep-sea mining regulations.145

138.
See supra Section I.E.; Ronald Reagan, Statement on United States Participation in
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Jan. 29, 1982),
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/12982b [https://perma.cc/M95W-7DBL]; see
also
Member
States,
INT’L
SEABED
AUTH.,
https://www.isa.org.jm/member-states
[https://perma.cc/P5LF-5VTP] (last visited Feb. 25, 2022).
139.
See Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resource Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(3).
140.
Tong, supra note 82, at 323.
141.
See About ISA, supra note 108 (describing the member states and jurisdiction of the
ISA); Ted R. Bromund, James Jay Carafano & Brett D. Schaefer, 7 Reasons U.S. Should Not Ratify
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (June 4, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/7-reasons-us-should-not-ratify-un-convention-the-law-the-sea
[https://perma.cc/J2LG-4S8R] (arguing the freedom the United States maintains outside of
UNCLOS is in the Nation’s best interest as a sovereign because UNCLOS membership would
simultaneously not confer any new benefits that the United States does not already enjoy and
would expose US mining to regulations of an “unelected and unaccountable bureaucracy”).
142.
See 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12); Tong, supra note 82, at 323–24.
143.
See Tong, supra note 82; see also Brousseau, supra note 87.
144.
Tong, supra note 82, at 323, 325; Danley, supra note 21, at 258–60.
145.
Tong, supra note 82, at 335–38.
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2. Potential Drawbacks of ISA Regulation
Uncertainties around both the composition and functioning of
deep-sea ecosystems, as well as the operations of large-scale commercial
deep-sea mining, could reduce the initial efficacy of ISA regulations.
Relative to terrestrial and coastal ecosystems, the composition and key
processes of deep seafloor ecosystems within the Area are poorly
understood.146 This lack of knowledge makes establishing clear
environmental and ecosystem baselines difficult.147 Because no
previous large-scale mining in deep-sea environments can serve as a
basis for ISA regulations and much of the deep sea itself is unexplored,
the environmental impact of mining in these environments is difficult
to predict.148 Preliminary evidence suggests the dredging of
seamounts;149 the scrapping, compressing, and dispersing of soft
sediments on the abyssal plain;150 and the cutting of hydrothermal
vents, can dramatically alter the community composition and structure
of these environments for decades.151 Similarly, the restoration of
impacted deep-sea environments is largely unprecedented and
uncertain.152
The combination of uncertain environmental impacts from
deep-sea mining in remote, difficult-to-monitor environments, and the
relative autonomy of the ISA, has raised concerns that once mining has
begun, alterations to exploitation regulations that further minimize
impacts may take substantial time and effort.153 Without clear
environmental standards and procedures that set forth how parties can
monitor and establish that mining activities are causing “serious

146.
Id. at 329; see Niner et al., supra note 19, at 4–8 (describing a hierarchy of mitigation
principles to protect poorly documented and understood biodiversity in the deep sea from
mining).
147.
Niner et al., supra note 19, at 4–8.
148.
Id. at 8; Miller et al., supra note 16, at 19; Levin et al., supra note 54, at 248.
149.
Miller et al., supra note 16, at 14; Koschinsky et al., supra note 73, at 677.
150.
Miller et al., supra note 16, at 12; Levin et al., supra note 54, at 250–51.
151.
See Boschen et al., supra note 48, at 59–60; Miller et al., supra note 16, at 12–15; see
also Erik Simon-Lledó, Brian J. Bett, Veerle A. I. Huvenne, Kevin Köser, Timm Schoening, Jens
Greinert & Daniel O. B. Jones, Biological Effects 26 Years After Simulated Deep-Sea Mining, SCI.
REPS., May 29, 2019, at 1 (noting the uncertainty of ecological impacts on deep-sea mining and the
limited recovery of an experimentally disturbed area twenty-six years after the sediments were
disturbed). But see Gollner et al., supra note 35, at 83–86 (discussing the rapid, but highly variable,
recovery of hydrothermal vents disturbed by volcanic eruptions and distinguishing
rapidly spreading vents from slower-spreading and inactive vents).
152.
See Koschinsky et al., supra note 73, at 677; Boschen et al., supra note 48, at 60.
153.
See Koschinsky et al., supra note 73, at 682–85 (discussing the many uncertainties,
such as the development of legal regimes, state actions, and social licenses to operate, associated
with the emergence of deep-sea mining).
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harm,” the ability and willingness of the ISA to halt operations or adjust
regulations is uncertain.154
Scholars have also raised concerns about the lack of
transparency in deep-sea mining decisions because some ISA meetings
occur behind closed doors with limited third-party observation or
participation, and no appeals system exists for ISA decisions.155
Similarly, the availability and quality of the safety, environmental, and
compliance data that the ISA provides are often unclear.156 As a result,
should ISA regulations prove to be environmentally insufficient, the
ability and willingness of the ISA to rapidly respond to external
pressures to increase environmental protections in its regulations is not
obvious.157
Holdout nations could also pose challenges to ISA regulation.158
The ISA Assembly is a large and diverse body with representatives from
167 nations and the European Union, but holdouts from the agreement
could undermine the efficacy and enforcement of the regulations it
produces.159 For example, companies could utilize holdout nations to
skirt ISA regulations.160 The widespread recognition and adoption of
UNCLOS and ISA regulations, however, bring companies working
within member nations the security of internationally recognized
mineral and property rights.161 In addition, the prospect of securing
154.
See Levin et al., supra note 54, at 246–48.
155.
Jeff A. Ardorn, Henry A. Ruhl & Daniel O.B. Jones, Incorporating Transparency into
the Governance of Deep-Seabed Mining in the Area Beyond National Jurisdiction, 89 MARINE POL’Y
58, 65 (2018); see also Jonathan Watts, Deep-Sea ‘Gold Rush’: Secretive Plans to Carve Up the
Seabed Decried, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/dec/09/secretivegold-rush-for-deep-sea-mining-dominated-by-handful-of-firms [https://perma.cc/97J4-TK8M] (Oct.
29, 2021, 7:36 AM).
156.
See Ardorn et al., supra note 155.
157.
Gollner et al., supra note 35, at 92–97 (describing the variability in community
recovery and resilience across ecosystems of interest for mining and the gaps in knowledge that
make predicting the impacts of mining difficult); Levin et al., supra note 54, at 247–49
(discussing the ISA’s regulatory requirement to prevent “serious harm” to the marine
environment and the difficulty of doing so without adequate data and an understanding of
deep-sea environments).
158.
See STEVEN GROVES, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE U.S. CAN MINE THE DEEP SEABED
WITHOUT JOINING THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 2–3 (2012), https://www.heritage.org/report/the-us-can-mine-the-deep-seabed-without-joining-the-un-convention-the-law-thesea [https://perma.cc/75W4-4ALU]. But see Lodge & Verlaan, supra note 125, at 332 (arguing that
provisions of UNCLOS are customary international law and may bind non-parties).
159.
See About ISA, supra note 108.
160.
See GROVES, supra note 158, at 14–15.
161.
See Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should
Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/-almost-everyone-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-seatreaty/258301/ [https://perma.cc/63KS-84M6].
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mining rights provides strong incentives for mining companies that
must expend enormous capital upfront to only work with nations that
ratified UNCLOS and adhere to ISA regulations.162
C. Private Environmental Governance
Private environmental governance is an alternative,
nongovernmental framework that addresses environmental problems
through private contracts.163 Supply chain contracts, loan agreements,
and resource agreements can all influence environmental outcomes.
Each can require disclosure of potential environmental harms,
mitigation guarantees, third-party certification of operations to public
or private standards, or other requirements intended to limit the
environmental impact of a given activity.164 These contract provisions
can limit the exploitation of common-pool resources, reduce
externalities, and more equitably distribute environmental amenities
similar to, but entirely separate from, prescriptive national or
international law.165 Contracting parties and firms may include
environmental provisions to create sustainably sourced products that
cater to environmentally conscious markets, bolster public perception
of the firm, or satisfy perceived social obligations to their
communities.166 Prior agreements with nonprofit groups, neighbors, or
other private standard-setting organizations may also compel
commercial parties to insert provisions that limit environmental
impacts into their future contracts.167 Private agreements have the
potential to fill gaps within and extend existing regulatory regimes, or
they can supply separate, independent standards and certification
schemes for otherwise unregulated activities.

162.
See id.; Danley, supra note 21, at 256.
163.
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting
in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 914 (2007) [hereinafter New Wal-Mart Effect].
164.
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
129, 146, 160 (2013) [hereinafter Private Environmental Governance].
165.
Id. at 146.
166.
See id. at 137; Louis G. Leonard III, Under the Radar: A Coherent System of Climate
Governance, Driven by Business, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10546, 10552–55 (2020) (describing some of the
primary drivers motivating firms to participate in environmental governance).
167.
See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029,
2055 (2005) [hereinafter Private Life of Public Law] (describing the incorporation of
environmental provisions in credit agreements as a result of prior commitments to nonprofit
organizations).
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1. Private Agreements to Fill Gaps and Extend Regulatory Regimes
Where public laws exist, private agreements can supplement or
extend environmental regulation.168 Private supply chain contracts can
coerce suppliers to adjust their operations or find alternative sources to
lower environmental impacts in production.169 Globally dominant
corporate buyers like Wal-Mart, who dominate large sections of the
retail market and maintain extensive, global supply chains, may
impose requirements on the environmental attributes of produced
goods and the processes through which the goods are produced.170 Large
corporate buyers can force suppliers to adhere to specified regulatory
regimes or impose even more demanding requirements on suppliers as
terms of the corporation’s purchase.171 Because corporate buyers’
market share can be large, contractual obligations will produce ripple
effects down the supply chain and across national borders.172 As a
result, incorporating environmental provisions in supply chain
contracts has the potential to mediate environmental impacts across
jurisdictions and between importer and exporter countries that may
have dramatically different environmental regulations.173
In addition to supply chain contracts, commercial transactions
associated with loans, real estate, and other agreements may require
contracting parties to adhere to stated environmental standards or
impose stricter obligations.174 For example, an analysis of loan
agreements filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in 2005 found environmental provisions in over 70 percent of the
1,500 credit agreements evaluated.175 Lenders have even included
provisions that allow them to monitor the borrower’s activities over the
course of the loan and enable the lender to enforce regulatory
compliance.176 In general, all of these provisions allow contracting
parties to lower the potential for environmental harm from commercial
activity. Any risk of subsequent liability or public outrage associated
168.
Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 186–88 (discussing spillover
effects of environmental contractual provisions). See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim
Rossi, The Gap-Filling Role of Private Environmental Governance, 38 VA. ENV’T L.J. 1 (2020)
[hereinafter Gap-Filling Role of Private Environmental Governance].
169.
New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 163, at 959–61.
170.
Id. at 916–17, 949–50.
171.
Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 156.
172.
See New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 163, at 919–20.
173.
See id.
174.
See Private Life of Public Law, supra note 167, at 2045–66 (describing the many forms
of agreements in which parties may include environmental provisions).
175.
Id. at 2051–52; see Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 158.
176.
Private Life of Public Law, supra note 167, at 2053.
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with the environmental harms is thereby similarly reduced.177 As a
result, environmental provisions may be incorporated in a wide variety
of commercial transactions when one or both parties feel that
controlling environmental impacts will increase the profitability or
lower the overall risk associated with the transaction.178
2. Private Certification Schemes and Standard Setting
Private certification schemes can also extend environmental
regulation into areas with weaker or non-existent public environmental
regulation to lessen the environmental impact of a given activity.179
These certification regimes can act like private regulatory agencies that
independently develop standards of conduct and then certify products
or services that comply with those standards.180 Critically, these
certification schemes also label goods or services that adhere to their
standards to provide a signal within the market that the labeled
product is environmentally sustainable.181 Labeling goods is central to
private certification schemes because labels connect producers and
servicers that adhere to the certification standards to the demand for
sustainable goods and services in the market.182 This market access
may justify higher compliance costs that result from the certification
scheme.183 Organizations that develop and implement certification
schemes might also then act as “standard-promoter[s]’’ that promote
the quality and outcomes of products that adhere to their standards.184
Developing independent standards that producers will
voluntarily adhere to and that will have meaningful consequences on
environmental outcomes can be time-consuming, contentious, and
expensive.185 To balance competing interests in standard-setting,
177.
See id. at 2052–53; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Implications of Private
Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 117, 123–24 (2014) [hereinafter
Implications of Private Environmental Governance].
178.
See Private Life of Public Law, supra note 167, at 2045–66; New Wal-Mart Effect,
supra note 163, at 946–50 (discussing the role of consumer and socially responsible investors on
the social license to operate as well as the potential for environmental provisions to ensure stable
supply chains and increase rivals’ costs).
179.
See Implications of Private Environmental Governance, supra note 177, at 133–34.
180.
Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 148.
181.
Id.
182.
Will Martin, Marine Stewardship Council: A Case Study in Private Environmental
Standard-Setting, 44 ENV’T L. REP. 10097, 10097 (2014).
183.
See id. at 10098 (describing the market demand and market rewards associated with
complying with the independent certification scheme as incentives for fisheries to “up their game”).
184.
Id. at 10097.
185.
See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 169 (listing the funding as
a “substantial problem”); Martin, supra note 182, at 10098 (suggesting MSC governance is

620

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:3:595

certification-scheme designers should engage a wide spectrum of
interested parties to build a broad consensus around the standards.186
Designers should also develop their certification standards so that
regulated parties can, and will, adhere to the standards during their
commercial activity while simultaneously satisfying environmental and
other interest groups’ salient environmental concerns.187 Successful
certification schemes, like the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC),
strive for an objective, independent, and data-driven process.188 They
function like public administrative institutions that provide procedural
processes and transparency for interested parties during standard
development and enforcement. This inclusion of all parties in decisionmaking instills a sense of fairness into the processes that may be
attractive to regulated parties.189
This certification design may, however, require substantial
resources to fund research, publication, and discussion of potential
standards. Difficulties may also arise in the enforcement and marketing
of a standard once it has been adopted.190 For organizations to
meaningfully develop, enforce, and revise standards with this design,
they likely need long-term financial backing.191 Such resources may
only be available for markets in which demand for sustainable goods is
high, strong public regulatory action is perceived to be imminent, or
where a resource is clearly limited or vulnerable and thus critical for
industry survival.192 The development of certification schemes for
commodities like grains and minerals can be difficult because
successful because the organization is a multi-stakeholder organization that develops and evolves
standards in an inclusive, objective, scientific, transparent process and uses independent,
third-party assessors to apply the standards in certifying fisheries).
186.
See Martin, supra note 182, at 10099 (describing the multi-stakeholder design of the
Marine Stewardship Council as one of the key design attributes of the scheme to prevent any one
sector from dominating).
187.
See id. at 10098 (describing the tension between industry groups viewing MSC
standards as a set bar that may already be “[too] high” and environmental groups that often
criticize MSC standards as “too low”).
188.
See id. at 10098–99 (suggesting MSC governance is successful because the
organization is a multi-stakeholder organization that uses independent, third-party assessors to
assess fishery stocks and develop standards in a guided but objective, scientific process
resembling public administrative law).
189.
See id. at 10099 (discussing the engagement of stakeholders and development of
standards similar to public administrative law).
190.
See id. at 10097 (highlighting the success of the MSC scheme as a result of not only
investing resources to develop a standard with independent scientific evaluation, diverse input,
substantial review, but also active promotion of the standard).
191.
Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 169.
192.
See id. at 186–87 (describing the potential for private regimes and provisions to
deter more efficient public regulation and the potential for private regimes to support or reduce
costs of government actions); New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 163, at 949–50.
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consumers are not purchasing directly from producers, and the final
good does not necessarily have an obvious connection to the
commodity.193
3. Potential Drawbacks of Private Environmental Governance
Both bilateral environmental contract provisions and
independent certification schemes have the potential to undermine
public law initiatives. If private agreements generate the perception
that an activity is effectively regulated, but alternative private or public
law initiatives would be more effective or efficient, then the existing
private governance scheme may have a negative spillover effect on the
potential to develop a better public or private scheme.194 Industry
groups can deliberately include token environmental provisions in
contracts or develop lax standards as industrial “greenwashing” to
boost their public image and dampen public desire for more stringent
public regulation of commercial activity.195
Likewise, environmental contractual provisions and private
certification schemes may not provide the general public or regulatory
agencies with information on their efficacy or may obscure the parties
most responsible for environmental outcomes.196 Enforcement of
contract provisions may not require public adjudication of facts or even
public notification of contractual disputes because the parties may
informally contact one another or act through lawyers.197 Even
substantial legal disputes may be resolved in private dispute resolution
proceedings rather than in public courts.198 Contracting parties may
also have to include environmental provisions in their agreements
because one or both parties are bound by a prior agreement with a third
party, who may not be obvious within the new agreement but can still
seek enforcement of the provision.199 As a result, not only could the
general public and regulatory agencies have difficulty determining the
efficacy and legitimacy of private certification schemes or contractual
promises, but both could have difficulty determining the party
193.
See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 152.
194.
Id. at 186–88.
195.
Id. at 175, 186–88; Eric L. Lane, Greenwashing 2.0, 28 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 279,
280–81 (2013); see also Jennifer Jacquet, Daniel Pauly, David Ainley, Sidney Holt, Paul Dayton,
& Jeremy Jackson, Seafood Stewardship in Crisis, 467 NATURE 28, 28–29 (2010) (arguing that
market incentives caused drifts in the goals of the MSC certification scheme).
196.
Private Life of Public Law, supra note 167, at 2069–71.
197.
Id. at 2070–71.
198.
Id.
199.
See id. at 2055, 2070 (describing how indemnitors and insurers may influence firm
behavior, but their influence may not be apparent to the public or regulatory authorities).
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ultimately driving environmental decision-making within a given
transaction or activity.200
Similarly, bilateral contracts may require certain procedures or
certification systems be followed but not necessarily that the proscribed
procedure or scheme is environmentally appropriate or adequate.201
Private environmental governance can change firm behavior, and
studies suggest positive outcomes on environmental impacts,
particularly with private certification schemes, such as increases in the
status of fisheries stocks managed under the MSC.202 Few studies,
however, have directly connected private efforts to limit environmental
consequences to realized environmental impacts.203 Like public
regulation, private governance will require consistent evaluations
to ensure that firms adjust their behavior and that a positive
environmental outcome results from that behavior adjustment.204
III. PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE TO LIMIT THE HARMS OF
MINING
The ISA is closer than ever to adopting exploitation regulations
for the Area’s first large-scale, commercial mining operations.205
Because demand for rare-earth metals available in the deep sea is
expected to rise, and autonomous vehicles capable of operating at
extreme depths are already operational, preparation for the first
mining operations will likely commence shortly after the ISA
regulations are adopted.206

200.
Id. at 2070–71.
201.
Implications of Private Environmental Governance, supra note 177, at 128.
202.
See id. at 131–33.
203.
Id.
204.
See Martin, supra note 182, at 10099 (highlighting the MSC’s annual fishery
surveillance audits and the reassessment of fishery stocks every five years to ensure fishery
assessments are accurate and that standards are effective).
205.
James Munson, Global Seabed Mining Rules Could Be Delayed to 2021 Due to Virus,
BLOOMBERG L. (May 29, 2020, 9:28 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/global-seabed-mining-rules-could-be-delayed-to-2021-due-to-virus [https://perma.cc/3G8U2XQR].
206.
ISA mining regulations will likely require preliminary environmental impact
analyses that may delay the commercial operation, but these assessments will likely commence
not long after ISA regulations are adopted or have already begun. See Daniel O.B. Jones,
Jennifer M. Durden, Kevin Murphy, Kristina M. Gjerde, Aleksandra Gebicka, Ana Colaço, Telmo
Morato, Daphne Cuvelier & David S.M. Billett, Existing Environmental Management Approaches
Relevant to Deep-Sea Mining, 103 MARINE POL’Y 172, 176–77 (2019) [hereinafter Existing
Environmental Management Approaches] (discussing the development of environmental impact
assessments); Baggaley, supra note 17; Jones, supra note 5.
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Given the vast capital and effort required to conduct deep-sea
studies and the remote, deep environments where they occur,
third-party observers and journalists may have difficulty monitoring
mining practices.207 Complete and detailed information on the
consequences of deep-sea mining and the proper regulatory responses
may take years to emerge after mining begins.208 However, as studies
and reports from mining operations accumulate, alternative regulatory
options or subtle changes in practices that better protect deep-sea
ecosystems could emerge.209 Despite over twenty years of rigorous
debate at the ISA and mining companies’ preemptive efforts to
minimize environmental harms from mining, some harms to the
structure and function of deep-sea environments are almost certain to
occur from the first commercial mining operations.210 Subsequent
alterations to mining practices may more effectively protect deep-sea
ecosystems.211
Private environmental governance could complement a
precautionary approach to deep-sea mining and ensure the adaptive
management of mining operations to mitigate impacts regardless of
where they occur in the oceans. Brand reputation is a significant driver
of private initiatives to adopt socially and environmentally conscious
policies.212 Firms sensitive to reputational harms or social
responsibility initiatives may not want to associate themselves with the
environmental consequences of deep-sea mining. As a result, they may
arrange their transactions to ensure the rare-earth metals, either
extracted with their capital or used in their products, were mined under
207.
Letter from Andrew Friedman, Assoc. Manager, Seabed Mining Project, The Pew
Charitable Trs. (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2021/01/isa-stakeholder-strategy-comments-pew_jan-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJ33-55RK].
208.
Ramirez-Llodra et al., supra note 20, at 19; Levin et al., supra note 54, at 248–49.
209.
See Stakeholders Provide Expert Feedback on Proposed Rules, THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRS., https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/projects/seabed-mining-project/development-ofseabed-mining-regulations [https://perma.cc/C4S6-VHM8] (last visited Feb. 26, 2022)
(highlighting the need for expert feedback on ISA rules); Andrew Friedman, After Chaotic Year,
Seabed Mining Oversight Body Must Strengthen Policies, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 12,
2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2021/02/11/after-chaotic-yearseabed-mining-oversight-body-must-strengthen-policies
[https://perma.cc/E9VH-NX2S]
(suggesting more regional conservation measures are needed and environmental impact
assessment requirements may be insufficient).
210.
See supra Section I.A–C.
211.
See David Shukman, Electric Car Future May Depend on Deep Sea Mining,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-49759626
[https://perma.cc/LC8Z-4SYC] (describing adjustments to autonomous vehicles to limit harms to
deep-sea environments).
212.
See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 167; Private Life of Public
Law, supra note 167, at 2059 (describing the incentives for environmental provisions in credit
agreements).
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the best available procedures. Alternatively, firms may elect to obtain
rare-earth metals from more sustainable alternative sources.
A. Potential Roles for Private Environmental Governance
Private contractual arrangements could serve as important gap
fillers to ISA or national regulations in order to ensure that mining
practices account for potential harms associated with the alteration of
the seafloor and water column.213 Environmental provisions in supply
chain contracts or credit agreements could demand that parties
guarantee their operations’ adherence to the latest emerging
environmentally sustainable deep-sea mining practices.214 Contractual
provisions could force changes to mining operations more rapidly than
ISA regulations that require ISA Council and Assembly consensus,
which may be more difficult after parties have a vested interest in the
existing regulations.215 Such provisions could require borrowers to use,
or suppliers only purchase from, operations using autonomous vehicles
upgraded with the latest technology to ensure minimal environmental
impact.216 Gap-filling provisions could also ensure that environmental
impact assessments: (1) are conducted over the spatial scales that data
suggests are most appropriate for the given environment, (2) consider
the cumulative effect of multiple mines and other environmental
stresses, and (3) require long-term monitoring of the mined site.217
Similarly, environmental provisions could also guarantee that
ISA regulations, more environmentally protective national regulations,
or private certification schemes are extended throughout the market for
rare-earth metals. These contractual provisions would ensure that
specified regulations are implemented within the transaction
regardless of the national or international waters from which the
minerals are sourced.
Other potential provisions within a supply or credit agreement
could require suppliers or borrowers to more aggressively account for
213.
See generally Gap-Filling Role of Private Environmental Governance, supra note 168.
214.
Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 157, 161 (describing the
commonality of environmental requirements in supply chain contracts and that resource
agreements may impose obligations on a small number of large suppliers that are then expected
to regulate many small enterprises).
215.
See Olivia Heffernan, Seabed Mining Is Coming – Bringing Mineral Riches and Fears
of Epic Extinctions, 571 NATURE 465, 466–68 (2019) (describing different viewpoints on whether
the ISA will be able to rapidly adjust regulations because of information that emerges from
monitoring of the first commercial deep-sea mines).
216.
See Shukman, supra note 211.
217.
See generally Aline Jaeckel, Strategic Environmental Planning for Deep Seabed
Mining in the Area, MARINE POL’Y, Feb. 2020, at 1.

2022]

A DEEP DIVE INTO PRIVATE GOVERNANCE

625

environmental impacts. Provisions could require mining operations to
protect fixed areas of the seafloor at the mine site, facilitate recovery of
mined areas, or actively restore the mined areas.218 If public awareness
and concern over the impacts of deep-sea mining grow, supply chain
contracts from corporations with substantial market share and
environmentally conscious shareholders or customers could even bar
deep-sea minerals from the corporation’s products.219 Given the complex
political dynamics associated with developing, implementing, and
enforcing international regulations, private environmental governance
could provide organizations with opportunities to respond to new
information on the environmental consequences of deep-sea mining and
the public’s perception of these operations.220

218.
See
Nicola
Jones,
A
Growing
Call
for
International
Marine
Reserves,
YALE
ENV’T
360
(Sept.
29,
2016),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/high_stakes_on_the_high_seas_international_marine_reserves
[https://perma.cc/7KVWGANG]
(describing
a
push
to
establish
protected
areas
in
the
ocean
beyond national jurisdiction to ensure a thriving ocean in the face of increasing fishing pressures
and the up-and-coming mining industry); see also C.L. Van Dover, J. Aronson, L. Pendleton, S.
Smith, S. Arnaud-Haond, D. Moreno-Mateos, E. Barbier, D. Billett, K. Bowers, R. Danovaro, A.
Edwards, S. Kellert, T. Morato, E. Pollard, A. Rogers & R. Warner, Ecological Restoration in the
Deep Sea: Desiderata, 44 MARINE POL’Y 98 (2014) (calculating the high cost of deep-sea
restoration and highlighting the potential to control restoration costs if they are considered a priori
and once economies of scale and specialized tools emerge).
219.
See Koschinsky et al., supra note 73, at 683–87 (discussing the social license
deep-sea mining operations need to mine and difficulties obtaining broad public support while also
describing different factors potentially influencing public support for operations); Stephen Nellis,
Apple Taps Recycled Rare Earth Elements for Iphone Parts, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-rareearths/apple-taps-recycled-rare-earth-elements-for-iphone-partsidUSKBN1W31JG
[https://perma.cc/GG37-NQ5J]
(Sept.
18,
2019,
7:09
AM)
(suggesting suppliers could find alternative sources of rare-earth metals for products if sufficient
concern for the environmental consequences emerges).
220.
See Koschinsky et al., supra note 73, at 682 (describing that “national regulations will
take many years to emerge and discussions at the ISA will continue once economic, social, and
environmental effects of deep-sea mining” become apparent); Niner et al., supra note 19, at 8
(concluding that, due to uncertainties of deep-sea ecosystems, net loss of biodiversity is almost
certain to occur).
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B. Who Might Include Environmental Provisions?
Because deep-sea minerals are necessary for the global
transition from fossil fuel to renewably powered economies and
transportation, the renewable energy and automobile industries can
substantially influence their supply chains to limit the environmental
consequences of deep-sea mining.221 Many automobile retailers and
manufacturers already consider environmental protection and fuel
efficiency in their designs.222 A majority of the top ten largest auto
manufacturers also impose some form of an environmental standard on
their suppliers.223 These requirements generally force suppliers to
comply with all environmental laws in their host countries or with
third-party environmental certification standards, such as standards
promulgated by the International Organization for Standardization.224
Volvo and BMW already publicly support a moratorium on
deep-seafloor mining until operations can clearly demonstrate they will
effectively protect deep-sea ecosystems.225 Under the right market
conditions, other auto manufacturers could also require battery
suppliers to ensure that the minerals used in their production processes
come from sources that adhere to ISA regulations, even if sourced in
nations that have not adopted UNCLOS or from non-Area waters.
Similarly—should the ISA not improve or adjust its regulations in
response to new information about deep-sea mining—automobile
manufacturers could include provisions that require more stringent
environmental provisions in their supply agreements.

221.
See Shukman, supra note 211 (highlighting the demand for cobalt that a thriving
electric car industry will produce); Jones, supra note 4 (describing that a shortage of rare-earth
metals may limit the transition to renewable energy sources).
222.
Brett Berk, Luxury Cars Go Sustainable from the Inside Out, N.Y. TIMES
(June 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/business/sustainable-materials-cars.html
[https://perma.cc/8LLY-MMFN] (describing how auto manufacturers are considering new ways to
make production environmentally sustainable); Highlights of the Automotive Trends Report, U.S.
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/highlights-automotive-trends-report [https://perma.cc/L673-NJQK] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (explaining that most
manufacturers lowered carbon dioxide emissions and increased fuel efficiency in automobiles over
the last five years).
223.
New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 163, at 930.
224.
See id. at 930–31.
225.
Frank Jordans, Automakers BMW, Volvo Back Moratorium on Deep Seabed Mining,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Mar. 31, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/technology-oceans-environment-overfishing-europe-3359dff680e15606dc9d069e1992e0bf [https://perma.cc/7K66-4EEX].
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Many countries, like India, Brazil, China, and Nigeria, will
continue to experience rapid economic growth and generate additional
rare-earth metal demand for electronic devices.226 As a result, personal
electronics manufacturers and retailers may be similarly situated to
automakers to pressure suppliers for sustainable mineral sourcing in
their products.227 Many personal computer manufacturers and retailers
already incorporate some sort of environmental mitigation requirement
in their supply agreements.228 These environmental requirements vary.
Some provisions in supply chain contracts only require suppliers to
adhere to domestic environmental laws, while other provisions require
that suppliers adopt organizational environmental management
systems that will consistently review, evaluate, and improve
environmental performance in the supplier’s operations.229 Apple has
transitioned to using recycled rare-earth metals for key components of
its latest iPhone and has signaled that rare-earth metal recycling is
critical for the industry.230 Samsung EV and Google publicly support a
moratorium on deep-sea mining until the operations clearly
demonstrate minimal environmental harm.231 If the environmental
consequences of deep-sea mining are substantial and public, electronics
manufacturers that are sensitive to environmental impacts or are
appealing to an environmentally conscious consumer base could
incorporate sustainable mining practices into supply agreements to
ensure their products are produced as sustainably as possible.
Furthermore, given the vast capital required for deep-sea
mining, institutional investors and banks could tie their financial
support of such operations to sustainability requirements.232 The
Equator Principles, which require companies to meet eight
Environmental and Social Performance Standards, are widely adopted

226.
See Koschinsky et al., supra note 73, at 672 (highlighting the increased demand for
metals in India, China, and other “transitioning countries”); HUND ET AL., supra note 25, at 38
(projecting that by 2050, most solar photovoltaic deployments are expected to take place in
non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, but especially in
China and India); Jeanne Whalen, The Next China Trade Battle Could Be over Electric Cars,
WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/01/16/next-chinatrade-battle-could-be-over-electric-cars/ [https://perma.cc/N7EA-ASJY].
227.
New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 163, at 930–32.
228.
Id. at 932.
229.
Id. at 930; Learn About Environmental Management Systems, U.S. ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ems/learn-about-environmental-management-systems#what-is-anEMS [https://perma.cc/FG9E-WYC9] (Sept. 28, 2021).
230.
Nellis, supra note 219.
231.
Jordans, supra note 225.
232.
Existing Environmental Management Approaches, supra note 206, at 174.

628

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:3:595

among project financing organizations.233 Performance Standard 6
requires borrowers to minimize impacts to biodiversity in the project’s
area of influence.234 The Equator Principles could thus force mining
operators to consider the consequences of their activities on deep-sea
biodiversity in light of developing scientific research and information
before they receive funds to conduct further mining.235 Institutional
investors are also increasingly mindful of their investment’s
environmental effects and could thus reconsider their ventures if
negative publicity surrounding the environmental consequences of
deep-sea mining emerges.236
C. Potential Independent Certification Schemes
Third-party, private certification schemes attempt to align
market preferences for sustainably sourced goods with firms that
supply sustainably produced goods by using labels in marketplaces.237
In theory, the economic advantage that firms derive from this
connection to consumers should incentivize firms to adopt these
environmental practices.238 Establishing effective and independent
certification schemes is, however, expensive to establish and requires
extensive organization to develop, implement, monitor, enforce, and
promote private standards.239 Given this expense and the likely
emergence of ISA regulations to govern mining in the Area, the
justification for a third-party, independent regulatory regime may not

233.
Id. See generally THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS’N, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES: EP4
(2020), https://equator-principles.com/ep4/ [https://perma.cc/J7YG-SKZP]; INT’L FIN. CORP.,
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 6: BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF
LIVING NATURAL RESOURCES (2012), https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/3baf2a6a-2bc5-417496c5-eec8085c455f/PS6_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=jxNbLC0
[https://perma.cc/G7KC-WHMZ].
234.
See generally INT’L FIN. CORP., supra note 233.
235.
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236.
See Paul Sullivan, A Call for Investors to Put Their Money Toward a Green Future,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/business/green-investments-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/2N63-8AUK] (describing Blackrock’s, the world’s largest asset
manager, decision to set environmental sustainability as a core goal).
237.
See Martin, supra note 182; Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at
148–49.
238.
See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 141–43, 166 (discussing the
incentives for users to overexploit common pool resources and that labelling products may address
this issue by allowing users that appropriately use common pool resources to access lucrative market opportunities).
239.
See generally Martin, supra note 182 (describing the multi-stakeholder organization
that is involved in the development, implementation, review, and marketing of a successful
private certification scheme, the Marine Stewardship Council).
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exist for some time.240 If sufficient consumer interest in sustainably
sourced electronics or energy production emerges, however, a private
certification scheme with labels to identify compliant products could
become feasible.241 Existing certification schemes like the MSC can
serve as models for creating a “Deep Sea Floor Stewardship Council”
that could provide independent mining standards and assemble and
disseminate information to the public and the market about existing
mining practices.242
D. Valuable Roles for NGOs
Regardless of the potential governance mechanism,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will likely have a critical role
in developing and enforcing environmental standards for deep-sea
mining. NGOs are not officially associated with or incorporated into the
ISA but play a key role in monitoring and publicizing discussions,
agreements, and initiatives in the ISA Assembly or Council.243 NGOs
will also likely be instrumental in evaluating and publicizing the
environmental consequences of deep-sea mining to the general
public.244 In addition, firms could develop environmental performance
agreements with NGOs that promise to meet or exceed regulatory
requirements to prevent public opposition to an activity.245 Thus, NGOs
could have critical direct and indirect roles that ensure the
environmental sustainability of deep-sea mining.
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See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 164, at 148 (describing the
development of the Forest Stewardship Council after a period of government inaction and failed
international agreements).
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[https://perma.cc/Q2WX-Z825] (last visited Feb. 27, 2022).
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See Miller et al., supra note 16, at 7, 19 (describing the involvement of NGOs during
development of exploitation regulations and mentioning a potential role for nongovernmental
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E. Limitations of Private Deep Sea Governance
Market pressure for sustainable production of goods and
services is a powerful incentive for firms to justify the incorporation of
private environmental governance into their decisions and operations.
Firms that incorporate environmental requirements into their business
models, however, must be able to internalize the cost of those
requirements unless the requirements increase efficiency to offset the
cost, stave off further government regulation, or otherwise lower the
transaction costs associated with the activity.246 High consumer
pressure for sustainably produced goods, competition from rivals with
fewer resources, or corporate recognition that long-term stability relies
on sustainable production may also justify investment in
environmental protection provisions.247 Parties are most likely to
include environmental provisions in rare-earth metal transactions if
the environmental consequences of deep-sea mining are publicized.
Publicity could spark selective purchasing of recycled or sustainably
mined products and can damage the reputation of companies that
purchase or invest in deep-sea minerals and mining operations.248
Because deep-sea mining will occur in remote and inhospitable
environments, monitoring the effectiveness of any regulations or
standards or determining whether operations adhere to regulations and
applicable contractual obligations will be costly and difficult.249 State
parties that sponsor mining operations and NGOs attached to the ISA
will likely be critical for the discovery and publicity of
deep-sea mining’s environmental impacts, as well as any deviations
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note 218, at 100–02 (highlighting the difficulty of raising public pressure to restore deep-sea
ecosystems that are far from the public’s eye).
248.
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ISA’s decisions); Deep Sea Mining Industry Confronted at Sea for First Time by
Greenpeace, GREENPEACE INT’L (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.greenpeace.org/international/press-release/47077/deep-sea-mining-industry-confronted-sea-first-time-greenpeace/
[https://perma.cc/7FUM-W3AE] (highlighting Greenpeace’s efforts to draw publicity toward the
environmental harms of deep-sea mining).
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See Niner et al., supra note 19, at 4 (highlighting the cost and difficulty of assessing
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note 218, at 103 (highlighting that 80 percent of estimated deep sea restoration costs are related
to ship time and autonomous vehicles that are necessary as a result of the deep and remote
environments).
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from regulations or private requirements.250 The effectiveness of NGOs
in this capacity, however, may turn entirely on the ISA’s cooperation
and the meaningful incorporation of NGOs in their processes.251 If deepsea mining occurs outside regulatory frameworks or if the ISA does not
develop and enforce a transparent regulatory scheme, the ability of
NGOs, and other observers, to monitor and share information on
mining practices may be limited.252 As a result, the entire regulatory
scheme, public and private, may rely on good faith observations and
reports of a relatively small number of organizations capable of
independently evaluating the practices and consequences of an industry
operating in remote and extreme environments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Demand for rare-earth metals is likely to surge as economies
around the world transition to renewable energy sources.253 The deep
sea has the potential to provide large amounts of high-quality
rare-earth metals to supply this demand, but the inadequacy of
information on deep-sea ecosystems means very little is known about
the potential consequences of mining in these areas.254 The ISA is the
international regulatory body charged with regulating the exploitation
of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, but some countries—
notably the United States—are not members of the ISA.255 To date, the
ISA is drafting, and will likely soon adopt, regulations for commercial
exploitation of deep-sea ecosystems.256 Although these regulations will
likely strive for a precautionary approach that limits damage to the
environment and adopts an adaptive management framework, the
limited data and knowledge of these systems mean some environmental
damage is inevitable.257 Private environmental governance has the
potential to reduce the harms of deep-sea mining as more information
on mining in deep-sea ecosystems emerges. Contract provisions can
ensure that corporations looking to sell their metals conduct rigorous
250.
See Observers, supra note 243 (describing the ability of nongovernmental
organizations to observe, but not vote during, the public deliberations of the ISA Assembly and,
upon invitation, the deliberations of the Council).
251.
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al., supra note 155 (noting limited public participation and the inability of observers to attend key
committee meetings).
252.
See Ardorn et al., supra note 155, at 62–63.
253.
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254.
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257.
Miller et al., supra note 16, at 1–2, 19. See generally Niner et al., supra note 19.
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environmental assessments before mining, adopt the latest mining
technology, and monitor and report the impacts of their operations over
the long term.258 Because these provisions only require the consensus of
the contracting parties, as opposed to the approval of a large regulatory
body like the ISA, they could quickly expand or extend the ISA
regulatory regime.259 If large financial investors and leaders in the
retail, technology, or automobile industry recognize the importance of
sustainable rare-earth metal production and consumption, they may
align their transactions in the commodities market to minimize their
impact on the deep sea by forcing contracting parties to adhere to best
environmental practices or—perhaps better—by finding alternative,
recycled sources for their technology.260
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